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AJ3 STRACT
The most striking aspects of recent U.S. wage and price behavior are the small
year—to—year variations in the rate of change of wages, the modest 1977—79accelera-
tion in the rate of change of both wages and the consumption deflator net of food
and energy, and an unprecedented gap between the inflation rates recorded by the
CPI and personal consumption deflator.
A small and simple econometric model is used to forecast the consequences of
various policies for the future growth of the monetary base. No policy will be
able to prevent an acceleration in the growth rate of the personal comsumption de-
flator net of food and energy from its recent 7 percent track to 8 percent or above
in the first half of 1980. The gross personal consumption deflator will climb
even faster, with the difference depending on the behavior of oil and food prices.
Thereafter, the effect of slack labor markets will begin to allow inflation
net of food and energy to decelerate substantially. A 6 percent rule for the mone-
tary base is too conservative and causes the unemployment rate to rise to 8.5 per—
cent in 1982. An 8 percent rule for the base is preferable, allows the unemployment
rate to begin to fall after late 1981, and still achieves a deceleration of in-
flation net of food and energy from 8 percent in mid—1980 to 6 percent in 1983.






(312) 492—3616"Whether you like it or lump it, this is one of the most interesting things
that's happened to monetary policy in years." ——CharlesSchultze
"the Fed experiments in how to operate hard money" ——headlinein the Economist
I. INTRODUCTION
Rarely has any policy shift been greeted by such universal acclaim as the
Fed's actions of October 6. Approval from journalists and businessmen and the
Administration was joined by a positive teaction by economists ranging across
the spectrum of opinion from Milton Friedman and Allan Meltzer to Arthur Okun.1
In fact, there may be some tendency on the part of the Governors to view the
present meeting of Academic Consultants as anticlimactic, like an expert's
report recommending the strengthening of air defenses delivered to the War
Department the day after Pearl Harbor.
Popular discussions of the current economic situation have been one—
dimensional in tone; inflation is running out of control, and there is no al—
ternative to a drastic tightening of monetary policy. This paper attempts to
divert attention from the transient events of the moment and to investigate
the fundamental relationships that should govern monetary policy over the next
year. Given the constraints faced by the economy, what is the set of growth
rates for nominal GNP, real GNP, and the GNP deflator that the Fed should at-
tempt to achieve, and what behavior of monetary aggregates is consistent with
these targets? The paper begins by reviewing the conceptual framework that
should guide policymakers faced with a supply shock; then examines the relation
between nominal GNP and monetary aggregates; and finally explores the factors
governing the likely division of nominal GNP growth between inflation and real
GNP growth and the effect of alternative policy actions on that division.2
II.POLICY RESPONSES TO SUPPLY SHOCKS DEPEND ON THE NATURE
OF WAGE-SETTING INSTITUTIONS
Policy Accommodation and Extremes of Wage. Behavior
Theacceleration of inflation in 1979 has not been purely due to ex-
cessive aggregate demand, but rather has been aggravated by increases in the
relative prices of food and energy. A supply shock may be defined as any
event that causes a discrete jump in the aggregate price level that firms re-
quire to be willing to produce a given quantity of real GNP; such an event can
be caused not only by a crop failure or a hike in the price of imported oil,
but by an autonomous "cost push" in the form of higher domestic indirect
taxes, profit margins, or wage rates. A common feature of all supply shocks
is that the division of any given level of nominal GNP is shifted toward a
higher price level and a lower level of real GNP. An expansive or "accommo-
dating" demand policy can moderate the impact on real GNP only at the cost of
raising the price level and aggravating inflation. Restrictive or "extinguish-
ing" demand policy can moderate the price increase only at the cost of further
aggravating the shortfall of real GNP. The choice between an accommodative,
extinguishing, or neutral demand policy depends primarily on the nature of
wage—setting institutions and on the relative welfare costs of inflation and
unemployment 2
The initial impact of an adverse supply shock, e.g., an OPEC price hike,
is to raise the share of total spending on the product in question (oil), if
its demand is price inelastic. The automatic consequence is that a fixed level
of nominal GNP will be devoted more to spending on oil and less to spending on
nonoil goods and services. The reduced amount of nonoil spending in nominal3
terms could be reflected in lower real nonoil output, lower nonoil prices, or
both. Imagine first that the domestic wage rate is fixed, and nonoil prices
are "marked up" over that wage rate by a constant fraction. Then all of the
impact of the supply shock will fall on nonoil real output. Because the wage
rate is unresponsive to aggregate demand, stabilization policy can boost
nominal Income and thus real nonoil output without raising nonoil prices.
Policy cannot prevent the overall price level (of oil and nonoil products
together) from rising, but it can prevent the wasteful loss of nonoil output.
The crucial feature allowing this beneficent impact of stabilization policy
is the willingness of workers to accept a loss in real wages, that is, in the
ratio of their fixed nominal wage to the higher overall price level.
At the opposite extreme assume that domestic wages are fully and instantly
Indexed to the overall price level and the change in the real wage depends only
on the pressure of real nonoil demand in the economy. Then the decline In the
real wage required to balance the adverse impact of the supply shock on labor
productivity is inhibited by the indexing formula and can be achieved only if
stabilization policy allows real nonoil demand to decline. Complete cost—of—
living escalation of the wage rate (or de facto real wage rigidity in wage
bargaining) thus makes a potentially serious recession and climb in the unemploy-
ment rate inevitable in the wake of a supply shock, a feature that several
authors have pointed to as explaining the failure of European economies to
recover after 1975 as rapidly as in the U. S.In such an economy with real—wage
rigidity, the economy's aggregate supply schedule is steep, and stimulative
aggregate demand policy will cause extra inflation with little benefit in the
form of extra real output.3 It has been suggested, in fact, that the slower4
post—1975 recovery that occurred in most OECD countries resulted not from a
different "taste for avoiding inflation" but rather from a different set of
wage—setting institutions that cripple the output—creating impact of stimula-
tive aggregate demand policy.
Applicationtothe U. S. Case
Oneof the most important phenomena in the U. S. economy is the inertia
displayed by year—to—year changes in the nominal wage rate, resulting from
the institutions of long—term overlapping wage contracts with decentralized
bargaining. While only part of the economy is unionized, the three—year con-
tracts set in the unionized sector tend to set a pattern for important parts
of the nonunionized sector. Because the aggregate nominal wage index depends
mainly on its own past values, and responds only partially to consumer price
inflation and real demand pressure, the aggregate real wage tends to be quite
flexible.
This and other features of U. S. wage and price behavior are, illustrated
in Table 1. The first two columns display two indexes of aggregate nominal
wage change that I have developed in my research; both indicate the same rough
tendencies, but the compensation index (column 1) is more erratic than the wage
index, both because it includes some types of non—wage compensation (fringe
benefits and social security contributions are included in both indexes), and
also because it is more subject to measurement error. The wage index in column
(2) displays a remarkable stability, with an increase between 6.5 and 7.7 percent
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The accelerations in the wage index that occurred in 1974—75 and in 1978—79
demonstrate that the U. S. nominal wage rate is not completely dominated by
inertia and does respond to consumer price inflation. Nevertheless, the
response is only partial, as we can see by subtracting from the wage index in
column (2) the change in the PCE deflator J. column (4). This real wage concept
is displayed in column (8), and its changes are compared with the contribution
to inflation of changes in food and energy prices (column 7). There is a
strong negative correlation; in both 1973—74 and in 1978—79, an acceleration in
the relative prices of food and energy was accompanied by a decline in the
growth rate of the real wage, and an absolute drop in the level of the real
wage in both 1974 and in the first half of 1979. It is this fleibility in
theU. S. real wage that gives policymakers some room for maneuver, andecono-
mists ampleroomfor debate, about the best policy to pursue in late .1979 and
1980.
An important feature of Table 1 is the divergent rates of growth displayed
by the CPI and the PCE deflator, especially in 1979. Because of its well—known
deficiencies, the CPI tends to exaggerate inflation, and to do so particularly
in years like 1969 and 1978—79 when interest rates are rising. The "double—digit"
inflation in the CPI decried by politicians and journalists has not occurred
in the PCE deflator thus far during 1979. And the acceleration in the PCE
deflator net of food and energy between 1976 and the third quarter of 1979 was
only 1.1 percent, far less than the 8.5 percent acceleration in the CPI over the
same interval. This comparison indicates how much of our inflation problem9
III.ESTABLISHING THE CASE FOR THE MONETARY BASE
AS A POLICY INSTRUMENT
Nomatter whether it decides to accoiimodate or extinguish a supply shock,
the Fed has to choose an operating instrument that it can use to carry out its
chosen policy. The erratic and unpredictable recent behavior of the velocity
of Ml and M2 has been widely noted, and various new monetary aggregates have
been proposed to incorporate money—market mutual funds, NOW accounts, RP's,
and other relatively new institutions. Table 2 illustrates the behavior of four
monetary aggregates, including the traditional Ml, 142, and monetary base, as well
as a new "augmented M2" that adds to the official 142 aggregate the value of
several new types of monetary institutions (see note a to Table 2 for details).
The explosion in all the aggregates in the third quarter of 1979, and
particularly augmented 142, is evident in Table 2. The remarkable annual growth
rate of nominal final sales in the third quarter is also recorded, although much
of the latter represents a "rebound" from the artificially depressed level of
economic activity in the second quarter (the average growth rate in the first
three quarters of 1979 has been 9.3 percent, with less growth in quarters two
and three combined than in the first quarter). Another important feature of
Table 2 is the much more stable growth rate of the monetary base since 1967
than any of the other aggregates, and this historical tendency is reinforced
by the 1979 experience.
Which monetary aggregate should the Fed attempt to control, once it has
1
decidedon its target growth rate of nominal final sales?There is no
clear tendency in Table 2 that would allow a choice among the aggregates,
other than an apparent increase in the growth rates of the velocity of MlTABLE 2




Ml M2 M2a Base -Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Four—QuarterRatesof Changeendingin:
1967:4 6.1 10.0 —— 6.3 6.8
l9684 7.3 8.1 —— 6.6 9.6
1969:4 4.1 3.3 4.0 4.4 6.5
1970:4 4.8 7.1 7.1 6.4 4.8
1971:4 6.5 10.9 11.7 7.4 9.2
1972:4 8.1 10.8 11.0 8.1 10.7
1973:4 6.1 8.6 9.4 7.9 9.4
1974:4 4.9 7.5 8.3 8.7 8.8
1975:4 4.3 8.1 7.9 7.4 10.5
1976:4 5.5 10.5 11.5 8.2 9.1
1977:4 7.2 9.2 9.9 8.5 10.9
1978:4 7.8 8.5 9.4 9.3 12.8
Two—QuarterRate ofChange atannualrateendingir:
1979:2 2.7 5.2 10.6 6.6 7.2
One—QuarterRate ofChange atannualrateendingin:
1979:3 9.6 12.0 18.4 8.9 13.4
Notes: a."Augmented M2" is obtained by adding to M2 the following items:
NOW accounts, other checkable deposits at thrifts, money market
mutual fund shares, and repurchase agreements of banks with the
nonbank public. Source: "Money: Not What Tt Used to Be,"
Business in Brief(publishedby the Economics Group of the
Chase Manhattan Bank), July/August 1979.
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and M2 after 1974—75 that may reflect a shift in the character of the demand
for those aggregates. In contrast to the marked. increase in thevelocity
of M2 that has occurred during the last three years after 15years of relative
stability, the velocity of augmented N2 in mid—1979 was close to its 1960—75
average value.
While St. Louis—type regressions of iominal income (or final sales)change
on the current and past changes in monetary aggregates have been rightly
discredited because they disregard the shifting response ofmonetary aggregates
to the behavior of income, nevertheless they can provide a usefulsummary
statement regarding the stability of velocity that is corrected for lags In the
influence of money on income. Estimates of two such equations for different
sample periods (1954—77 and 1966—77) have been extrapolated for the recent
seven—quarter interval 1978:1 —1979:3,with results that are summarized in
Table 3.
The top half of the table provides root—mean—squared errors for theseven—
quarter extrapolations. While all the errors are roughly similar in size,
those for the monetary base are smallest. The bottom half of the table
indicates errors in predicting the level of nominal final sales in1979:3,
a contest won by Ml for the longer period and by the monetary base for the
more recent 1966—77 sample period. Since it would appear that shifts in the
demand for Ml have occurred during the last fewyears as a result of financial
innovations, and that some of these innovations may have a smaller impact on
the monetary base, the latter may be the best availableaggregate for use
by the Fed as an instrument. The balance of this paper investigates the
effects of alternative growth rates of the monetary baseon inflation and
unemployment.TABLE 3
Post —SampleErrors
in Predicting Nominil Final Sales












A.Root—mean—squared Forecast Error(quarterly rateofchange):
1. Ml 1.10 1.13
2. M2 1.26 1.26
3. Augmented M2 1.18 1.22
4. Monetary Base 1.08 1.06
B.Forecast Error in 1979:3 (Percentof Actual)
1. Ml 2.53 2.53
2. M2 4.74 4.97
3. Augmented M2 3.30 3.39
4. Monetary Base 2.94 1.58
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IV.ALTERNATIVE FUTURE PATHS
OF INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Whileforecasts from numerous large econometric models are available
to guide policyinakers, predictions from small and simplified models are
useful as well because their operation can be more easily understood. For
the purposes of this paper I have constiucted a model that has only four
equations, plus a few definitional relationships. The four basic equations
are:
1. A price equation relates the rate of change in the personal
consumption deflatèr net of food and energy to a weighted average of its
own past values and of the rate of growth of trend unit labor cost, and to
current and past values of the difference between the official unemployment
rate and the "natural" unemployment rate. An attempt was made to include
prices of exports, imports, or both——to capture the impact of changing exchange
rates on domestic prices——but no significant effect emerged.
2. Trend unit labor cost is related to its own past values and to
changes in the personal consumption deflator including food and energy, as
well as to the current and past values of the difference between the official
unemployment rate and the "natural" unemployment rate, to changes in the effective
social security payroll tax rate, to changes in the effective minimumwage,
and to a dummy variable to capture the impact of the 1971—74 wage and price
control program (this dummy variable also appears in the price equation).
3. Changes in nominal final sales are related to current and four
lagged values of changes in the monetary base.
4. The unemployment rate is calculated by adding to last period's
unemployment rate a portion of the current and lagged change in the GNP gap.14
The GNP gap (the difference in percent between the actual level of real GNP
and "natural't real GNP) in turn is equal to its own past value plus the
rate of change of the difference between '?natural" and actual real GNP.
Actual real GNP is simply the change in nominal final sales minus the
change in the personal consumption deflator including fcod and energy. Finally,
the impact of food and energy prices on thf' prsona1 consumption deflator is
set at its historical values through 1979:3 and is set at assumed values thereafter.
There are several basic features of this framework that should be noted.
A supply shock has an impact on both wages and prices that persists long
after the date of its direct effect, but only about one—third of the total
difference made by changing relative prices of food and energy becomes
permanently incorporated into the inflation rate. Both the level and the change
in unemployment are allowed to influence the change in wages and prices, and
the computer's verdict is that the "change" effect is much more important than
the "level" effect. Finally, the procedure for calculating the unemployment
rate ignores inventory change and any factors that create a difference between
the behavior of the GNP deflator and the deflator for personal consumption
expenditures.
Three alternative paths of the monetary base are assumed in the forecasts
and they are displayed in the top frame of Figure 1. "Path 1" assumes a
constant 8.0 percent growth rate beginning in 1979:4, a rate which is below
the 1978 experience but slightly above the average thus far in 1979.
"Path 2" is a path similar to, but less dramatic than, the recommendation
of steady deceleration long adopted by the Shadow Open Market Committee.
Beginning at 8.0 percent in 1979:4, the growth rate of the monetary base
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percent in 1983. "Path 3" involves a drastic slowdown in the growth of the
monetary base to a 6.0 percent rate. Immediately below, the three
paths of nominal final sales are traced, with an implied trend increase in
the velocity of the monetary base of about two percent per year.
The bottom part of the figure illustrates the alternate inflation
and unemployment rates that are predicted to a"ompany the various paths
of the monetary base. It is important to recognize that no further supply
shocks are assumed to occur after mid—1980, and this feature of the fore-
casts both accounts for the optimistic inflation predictions and may make all
three forecast paths err in the direction of predicting too little inflation
and too low a rate of unemployment. As for the period between now and mid—
1980, the impact of food and energy prices on the personal consumption deflator
is assumed to shrink gradually from the actual annual rate of 3.3 percent in
1979:3 to zero in 1980:3. Scheduled increases in the minimum wage and payroll
taxes are assumed to occur in 1980:1, but not thereafter.
Some readers may be surprised at the rapid response of inflation to
the differences between the future paths of the monetary base. By early 1982
the two—percentage—point difference between Paths 1 and 3 has been fully
translated into a two—percentage—point difference in the inflation rate, and by
1983 the difference is even larger (this is a temporary overshooting effect
due to the impact of changing unemployment on wages and prices and does not
represent a lack of long—run "neutrality" in the model). Corresponding to an
assumed 2—to—i "Okun's law" relation between the GNP gap and unemployment, the
difference between the unemployment rate in 1982—83 between Path 1 and Path 3
is half the difference between the two inflation paths, or about one percentage
point.17
A disappointing feature of the forecasts is the long duration of the
period of high unemployment, particularly along Paths 2 and 3. The arithmetic
behind this phenomenon is quite simple. Since the growth rate of "natural"
(or "potential") real GNP is assumed to be three percent a year, real GNP
must grow faster than three percent a year for unemployment to begin to fall.
But this can occur only if the difference betwen the growth rates of nominal
final sales and the price level exceeds three percent. In the forecasts
this occurs first——in late 1981——along Path 1, at which time the growth rate
of nominal final sales is about 10 percent and of the inflation rate is
slightly below 7 percent. Along Paths 2 and 3 the slowdown in the growth
rate of the monetary base and in nominal final sales is fast enough, and
the inertial process dominating the inflation rate is strong enough, to
prevent the difference between nominal final sales growth and inflation
from exceeding three percent until late 1982.
V.CONCLUSION
Supply shocks can cause the U. S. Inflation rate to jump about erratically,
but in the absence of supply shocks the U. S. inflation process is dominated
by inertia that is both the blessing and the curse of policymakers. Inertia
can be a blessing when it prevents an energy price shock from becoming
fully and instantly incorporated into wages and nonenergy prices. But inertia
can be a curse when it interferes with the desire of policymakers to cause
a deceleration in the inflation process. Figure 1 illustrates quite clearly
a fundamental fact of life facing the Federal Reserve Board——an attempt to
jar the economy by switching to a radically slower path for the monetary base,
e.g., 6.0 percent per annum, must create a very long period of high unemployment.18
A more gradualist path, as represented by Paths 1 and 2 in the Figure, is
more consistent with the structure of our economy. Nevertheless, even
the modest rate of deceleration of nominal money and income growth along
Path 2 creates too much unemployment for my taste, and I think for the taste
of most politicians.
I am thus drawn to the conclusion that the Fed should maintain steady
growth of the monetary base at a rate of about 8 percent per year for the
next few years. If adverse supply shocks occur after mid—1980, this will lead
to a less optimistic set of inflation and unemployment rates than are depicted
along Path 1 in the Figure, but several years of good harvests and/or a
cessation of Increases in the price of oil would lead to a more optimistic set.
The 8 percent rule should not be maintained forever, but only until the inflation
rate falls significantly below the growth rate of nominal final sales minus
the growth rate of natural output, which occurs along Path 1 in late 1981.
After that point a policy of rigidly maintaining the 8 percent rule will lead
to an accelerating growth rate of real GNP and decline in unemployment and an
eventual overshooting of the economy's stable—inflation long—run equilibrium
level of utilization. Thus, after 1981 the Fed should gradually adjust downward
the growth rate of the base by a rising fraction of the difference between
sales growth and inflation to allow a "soft landing" in the mid l980s.
It may be asked whether 8 percent growth in the monetary baserepresents
enough restraint to fulfill market expectations of tight money kindled by
the, Fed's announcement of October 6. As illustrated in Table 2, the growth in
the base during 1976, 1977, and 1978 was above 8 percent, and an 8.0percent
rule during those three years would have resulted in amonetary base in 1978:4
almost two percentage points below the actual figure. Base growth in the third19
quarter of 1979 was about 9 percent, so that an 8.0 percent rule would
represent a deceleration from that experience as well.
It is ironic that the recommended Path 1, with its 10 percent growth
rate of nominal final sales, corresponds exactly to the recommendation of 10
percent growth in nominal final sales that I made in a consultants meeting
two years ago. Much of our present economic grief is caused by the fact that
nominal final sales was allowed to grow : the excessive rate of 13 percent
between early 1978 and early 1979. We must now suffer the consequences of this
failure to maintain stable nominal demand growth. Nevertheless, along Path 1
in the absence of further supply shocks the economy can emerge in 1982 and
1983 with an inflation rate similar to that of 1976—77 with an unemployment
rate little above that being experienced today.20
FOOTNOTES
1. To be sure, reactions on each end of the spectrum differed in tone.
Friedman and Meltzer were suspicious that the laudable prciouncement to control
bank reserves rather than the Federal funds r-'..e would not be matched by perfor-
mance, while Okun reluctantly admitted that "The Fed didn't have any alternative."
See Newsweek, October 22, 1979, pp. 37—39.
2. Two basic papers set out in more detail the analysis of policy responses
to supply shocks. See Robert J. Gordon, "Alternative Responses of Policy to
External Supply Shocks," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 6 (1975,
no. 1), pp. 183—204, and Edmund S. Phelps, "Commodity—Supply Shock and Full—
Employment Monetary Policy," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol. 10 (May
1978), pp. 206—21. This analysis is extended with an explicit treatment of
relative welfare costs in Edward M. Gramlich, "Macro Policy Responses to Price
Shocks," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, vol. 10 (1979, no. 1), pp. 125—66.
3. The rigid real—wage hypothesis has been analyzed in two recent papers,
William Branson and Julio Rotemberg, "International Adjustment with Wage Rigidity,"
presented at the International Seminar on Macroeconomics, September 11, 1979, and
Jeffrey Sachs, "Wages, Profits, and Macroeconomic Adjustment in the l97Os: A
Comparative Study," forthcoming in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (1979,
no. 2).
4. This paper takes as given the presumption that the erratic timing of
inventory accumulation, together with the lag in the impact of Fed policy, make
nominal final sales (GNP minus inventory change) a more sensible and stable
target for Fed policy than nominal GNP.